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THOUGHT: "Tbe Submarine Operation of tbehe Naval Operation of they Admiral Yu. Panteleyev
DATE OF IKFO:
OF CONTENT
reliable source
Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "The Submarine Operation of thehe Naval Operation of theritten by Admiral Yu. Panteleyev.
This article appeared In1 Third Issuepecial version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya
Mysl (Military Thought) . This Journal is publisHed"
irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by tbe Soviets. The1 Third Issue went to press onuly
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The Submarine Operation of tbehe Naval Operation of the Future
by
Admiral Yu. Panteleyev
In the past war the principal enemy of the fleet at sea was the aircraft armed with torpedoes and bombs. This is attested to by the statistics on losses of combat vessels by the nations Involved. Whereas,umber ofessel couldubmarine and then even pursue it the evasion of an aircraftessel was very difficult, and the overtaking and destructioneparting aircraft was completely impossible. It was hindered ln this by its significantly slower speed and by the limited ceiling of its antiaircraft artillery. In other words, in comparison with anessel possessed neither thenor tbe requisite firepower.
The submarine has actually remained all-powerful ever since World War I.
In our tlmo the aircraft and the submarine havemajor enemies of that leviathan of combatking of thehe battleship. Andwhich costs billions, has departed from theoceans in Ignominy; all naval powers have stoppedit. The same fate has also befallen other large The missile/nuclear weapon has become tbeof destruction even at sea. Its development hasthe division of naval power into two parts: oneof nuclear/missile delivery vehiclesin size than the old battleships andtaken to the air (jethe othor haswater, into the depths of tbe seas andsubmarine
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uture armed conflict primarily;air
operations have their own clear-cut organization and definite composition, the concept of "submarine operations" is entirely new and not reflected in our literature, and has not yet received the "rights of citizenship" in our naval art. Is this right? It would seem not. This conviction evolves from the following considerations.
The study of the history of military operations at sea in past wars must be carried out neither exclusively nor largely for the purpose of learning and defining the course and results of the events themselves, but rather for establishing the new trends in naval art which took placeiven war, what the prospects are for their development, and what results they might produce.
It will be recalled that "submarine warfare" has been mentioned more than once in naval art. The Germans especially declaimed about this; nevertheless, neither in the First nor Second World War, after having declared merciless submarine warfare against the Allies, were'they able to bring the Allies to their knees. After carryingeries of bandit attacks against hospital vessels, and after gaining, unquestionably, certain operational-tactical successes, the German submarine fleet was still unable to achieve any kind of strategic goals with submarines alone. Although partly disrupted, the supplying of England proper was not stopped. The failure of German "submarine warfare" is explained by the fact that their submarines,although able to gink enemy vessels at sea, were not able to demolish his military economy entirely, to destroy the basis for the construction of new vessels, and to crush the antisubmarine defense. For each transport sunk toward tbe end of the war, the Allies constructed two which were more modern.
Thus, in past wars submarines primarily carried out perational-tactical missions; strategic missions were not ithin their power to accomplish, primarily because of the status of equipment and the organization of the submarine fleet of those days .
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Is it correct it the present time to raise the question of the organization of purely submarine operations as naval operations of the immediate future? It seems to us that It is. elay in deciding this question can cause harm to the^future increase of the defensive puwtfr of^oTLrJco"untry.
First of all, let us attempt to define submarine operations. The meaning of "operation'1orm and method of achieving operational or strategic goalsery definite connotation in our military art; it is known to the reader and there Is no sense ln citing it here. Let us agree beforehand that we do not admit the possibility of resolving all missionsar, or the achievement of its strategic goals, by any one type of armed force. Victory.in_war.can be achieved only through the combined eTJorts of all types of armed forces in cooperation with one "another. Therefore, weubmarine operation as an ThTegraXjart of battle by the armed forcesavalrrying out the performance only of particular operational or strategic tasks.
ubmarine operation we mean an operation of submarine forces which is conducted in tbe depths of the ocean or the sea without rising to the surface. Tho term "underwater vessel" was not applied accidentally. The designation "underwater boat" appears to us to be too general, inexact, and not at all suitable for operational-tactical language. At the present time there are missile-carrying submarinesisplacement of several thousand tons, submarines for antisubmarine defense, and submarines of other ^designations. It is natural, therefore,eneric understanding be developed for all submarines, whether the submarine fleet or submarine forces which operate in their own peculiarn the depths of the oceans and seas.
A purely submarine operation can take place only when purely submarine missions are carried out in ocean depthsubmarine fleet and where the possibilities exist for their fulfilment by submarine forces. In the immediate
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futuro, Just as at present, tho submarine forces may conduct operations primarily io conjunction with the aviation and, in some instances, also with the surface fleet. But such operations will not be designatedoperations; it would be more exact to call them
operations of submarines.
As is known,at present submarines operate in close coordination with aircraft and surface vessels which are supporting their operations. Wereat deal of attention to this problem. Much is said about aerial reconnaissance on behalf of submarines and about the support afforded by surface vessels to the deployment of submarines from their bases or to their return. Some of these situations have become prescribed requirements. During any navalhorough minesweep of the channelsaval base is instituted directly prior to the departure of the submarines from tbe base. Also, in order to support this departure of submarines, all antisubmarine defense forces (protivolodochnaya oborqna -PLO) in the area of the naval base are deployed. (We have in mind destroyer escorts and aircraft of PLO.) pecial direct escort is organized to support the departure of submarines from the bases. This great number of ships at sea and aircraft circling about, all engaged in driving off enemy mlnelaying submarines and in "sweeping away" mines, without even knowing if thore are any at all, most blatantly reveal that an operation is being prepared.
KVen during tbe pastumber of measures for the so-called support of submarine deployment started to become outmoded, while submarines more and more gained the right for complete independence of action. Today this trend is becoming evident with an even greater force. Of course, the execution of all or part of the measures indicated above is not excluded even now in certain cases. However, it is entirely clear that such methods for supporting the deployment of submarines or supporting their combat activity are rapidly becoming outmoded and it is necessary to seek now measures.
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One more example. In order to force the enemy antisubmarine defense line with our submarines, it is considered essential to carry out decisive strikes from the air and sea against his PLO forces. But the execution of this strike makes it patently clear that our submarines are getting ready to force that particular line. In this manner, our actions will serveistinct combat alert for the enemy PIX). Is it not time for the submarine forces themselves to secure the forcing of the PLO line covertly underwater, without all the uproar on the surface of the sea and in the air? It seems to us thatime is here or practically here. Evidently, operations for forcing the PU> line will constitute one of the first submarine operations of the submarine forces.
What kind of operational and strategic missions can the submarine fleet resolve independently because of this developing situation?
As is well known, the military leadership of NATO countries still attaches special significance to itsaircraft carrier large units, viewing them as mobilefrom which aircraft can take off with nuclear weapons. According to the plan of the NATO leaders, thesebeing mobile, must be in their positions at the right time in the Atlantic, in the Norwegian Sea, and in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, from which they can destroy designated targets on the territory of the USSR.
-Aircraft carrier tnrge- uarts, thenemyre powerful but far from invulnerable. They can be destroyed, first of all, by_missile strikes of our aviation. But tneay'liry to create strong counteractions with his PVO forces and weapons against these strikes. At the present time it is extremely difficult to conceal the deployment of large masses or of separate groups of aviation and their approach to aircraft carriers, because the eyes of the enemy have become very keen and his ears sharp. The "sudden" appearance of strike aviation from behind the clouds is also excluded, inasmuch as to bank on the inadequacy of enemy equipment or on errors by his leadership is worse than foolhardy. Aircraft also cannot
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"hover" in on* zoneong time, awaiting the arrival of the enemy. For the enemy can deploy his aircraft carrier strike large unit (avianosnoye udarnoyeUS) prior to the beginningar under the most plausible pretexts (cruisesttraining exercises, etc,).
The submarine fleet possesses incomparably great capaTii titles, for.t_maydeployed in ccmplo^te secrecy, during the period of exacerbation of the mliifary^poli"tl<5al" situation, to those'vory areas of jhe.'pcean or sea, designated by the enemy as zones for fhg__deployment of his forcestrike against our Installations, And it may very well be that the enemywill not have time to take off for the deliverytrike, as they will go to the bottom together with their "airfield" after being attacked by nuclear weapons of the submarine forces which had been covertly deployed beforehand in the appropriate areas of the ocean or sea.
For tho execution of an independent submarine operation to sink the enemy strike aircraft carriers, is it sufficient to have only atomic submarines with nuclear weapons? JJpf it" is not sufficient I The resolution of this mission requires an entirely new organization of large units of the submarine forces. Zn the Interests of ammunition supply and technical servicing, submarines are still grouped in large units on the basis of class and type (submarines with atomic engines, submarines with diesel engines, submarines with torpedoes, submarines with missiles,uch large units are not suitable for carrying outsubmarine operations.
Uponombat mission to destroy anubmarineroup of them) must, at the present time, first of all bc guided to the target either by aircraft oreconnaissance screen of submarines. Tho commander of an attacking submarine does not see or know who Is providing his tactical support or where it is and is forced to operate independently; he watches nothing except the target. Submarines beneath the,surface*do not yet represent dependably controlled large units
It appear? toat it la now essential to create separate subxirine lirge units capable ofo!viig tactical or operational missions. We have in isind submarine squadrons of vessels with atomic propulsion;quadron must consist of svrike submarines (with missiles andeconnaissance submarines with powerful hydroacousticalntisubmarine defense submarines, minela^ing_.submarines, and supply submarines. Upon receiving iTs combat mission for operations in a ar-sa of the ocean or sea, the submarine squadron, independently, with its own submarine reconnaissance forces, must find the assigned target and direct Its strike forces against it. e basis of his intelligence data, the commander of the operation must plan the main direction of tho strike and determine the forces to bc used against the main target, the operational makeup of these forces, and the force= to be usedtrike along the auxiliary axis. umber of instances the covert laying ofanchored or floating) may delay enemy deployment and in this manner support the operations of the strike submarine forces. It is doubtful that the existing hydro-acoustical equipment of the enemy will be able to determine acFurSWly "the entire depth of the operational makeup of the submarine forces and the large number of attacking submarines deployed at various depths. In.anyhe ranges of this equipment are still much less than thecur modern long-range torpedoes, let alone missiles.
It Is evident that an ocean-going atomic submarine, Carrying powerful nuclear armaments, must have its own reliable defense under water froa enemy submarines 'antisubmarine defense) and from mines (while moving at correspondingn order that the submarine commander can devote ail his attention to the majorhe attack of the assigned ti.rget . th the development of the means ofor television, sonar, and communications, the controlubmarine fquadron becomes possible and submarine battles tnd engagements with alleconnaissance- deployment, strikes against protective forces and againstain target -assume realistic forms.
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Of course, an operation for the destruction of an AUS may be conducted, as we have already indicated, either by aircraft alone or in coordination with submarines We do cot excludeariant, for it does not contradict the basic views Indicated above. But we reiterate that even for joint operations with aircraft, the submarine forces must be organizedew principle This is primarily necessitated by the strengthened defense of the AUS and by the rising cost of atomic missilewhich require considerable support in all their operations. (We have in mind reconnaissance, PLO, andhose types of defenseattleship required for itself on the surface of the seas in its time.) It can be said that since "naval power" has gone under water, all of its defense must also go under watir.
We have already spoken of the impossibility of aviation1ong time in waiting zones, of itslower capability than submarines for covert tactical deployment, and of the great dependence of aviation upon the condition and availability of an airfield network. To this must also be added the dependence of aviation capabilities upon the weather. Thus, by no means can aviation always guarantee the complete success of its operation against the AOS on all expanses of the world's oceans.
The struggle, for securing the possibility of the first f eriod cf war will be ar. important
problem for bcrh sides; therefore,umber of instances, the operatioral deployment of forcesuring peacetime will be unavcidable. Even today submarine forces can occupy necessary waiting positions and from them conduct covert and prolonged observation of the enemy. Aircraft tmnnot do this- Sonar is incapable of determining either the hull number or the designationubmarine; for this reason, during an intermittent sonar sounding fcr submarines it is difficult tc determine immediately the number of submarines operatingiven area, since the same submarine may beetal times.
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Ve are correct in asserting that "underwater danger" is more serious than aerial danger, for it is more difficult to gain rapidly tho particulars of an undorwater situation than of aerial one. After intercepting the enemy, The submarine forces are capable of delivering strikes against him repeatedly and ofursuit while reloading their torpedo nuclear weapons underwater. All these considerations speak for the advantages and the reality of submarine operations.
Although recognizing the vulnerability offrom the sea, as well as from the air, for the time being are still timid but,are expre&ting views on the growingaircraft carriers as floating, maneuvorableattention of these authors is turning tosubmarines which can use their missiles from theseas and oceans and, especially, from the areasArctic (through the many unfrozen patches ofthef Ice) where an aircraft carrierat all. It is natural, that in contrastumorous support vessels andappearance of our missile-carrying submarines inand their tactical deployment at great depthswe have indi'rsttd, be carried out covertly withoutof the surface fleet of the enemy, hiseven more so, the shore facilities for thesubmarines. Neither aircraft carriers nor theaircraft can counteract the arrival ofthe Arctic area. The sicking of one or twotheir passage into the Arctic by surfaceaircraft will sotecisive effect. Inonly entity submarines will be able to
of cur submarines. And only our submarinerganized intc submarine squadrons and carrying out submarlco operations, can counteract thia formidable force of xbi ensmy.
We shall discuss briefly the plan of operations for the destruction of enemy misalle-carryicg submarines in the Arcticnder tire ice iu the depths of the
Arctic Baste Hero, neither an aircrafturface vessel canubmarine in the usual manner in any way. Our submarine squadron large unit of submarine forcesiven theater) must first of all have its own underwater reconnaissance, consisting net only ofsubmarines but also of technical equipment for submarine detection, installed by special mlnelaylng submarines under the ice ^buoys fcr detecting enemymine obstacles, and nets%. The creation of such means is not an insoluble problem. In addition, our strike missile-carrying and torpedo submarines for combat against enemy missile-carrying submarines in the ocean depths under the ice mustobile underwater patrolirect underwater defense consisting of PLO submarines and submarines for detecting mine obstacles (submarine mine detectors ype of submarine mine-sweepor) . quadron commander must command such an operation from one of the submarines* Control of the forces must be based on reliable means of underwater communication and television. Tho validity of such an operation has already become apparent, however, the materiel base for its -resolution is still more theoretical than practical. Let us recall that this is not the first year that American atomic submarines have studied the under-ice Arctic area.
During the conduct of submarine operations it is absolutely necessary chat each submarine know its place in the formation and its place in relation to the bottom of the ocean or sea andr&st banks and islands, first of all for security nf navigation, as well as for the tasks of tactical deployment and placement of technical means Of combat (buoys, rair-es, nets). One of tho most important navigational aids for helping submarines determine their positionell-made naval chart showing depths of the Arctic basin ard a. series of other important data (underwater currents, the steepness and unevenness of the bottom, as well as its characteristics). submarine" chart should be it the making now and should be periodically updated with cew data tareas cf sound channels and other hvdrolcgicalor the most detailed portrayal of the entirenvironment. However, the availability of even the aosi detailed charts
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cannot guarantee that there will be an exact pinpointing of the submarine's position. uestion arises concerning the creation of underwater hydroaccustic beacons for submarines, concealed from the enemy and operating when triggered by our submarines. Theoretically, the creation ofeacon, operating on the basisoded format, also presents no problem.
We do not deny, of course, the possibility of submarine forces* detecting enemy submarines through the use of technical equipment installed on the ice surface or in the water through holes cut into the ice. But in view of the great mobility and hummocking of Arctic ice and of the vulnerability of these technical means from the air, it should be taken into consideration that these technical means will be used only occasionally. Therefore, they should not be the principal basis on which the reliability of an entire submarine operation is planned.
Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that combat against missile-carrying submarines under the ice in the Arctic isubmarine operation, in which the participation of other types of armed forces is completely insignificant. On the basis of all that has been stated, it is now time to consider the creation of submarine sailing directions for the seas and oceans.
Combat with enemy missile-carrying submarines outside the Arctic basin must be planned on the same principles as those in the Arctic. To escape aerial and surface pursuit, modern enemy atomic submarines more and more are increasing the depth of their dives, which are now measured in hundreds of meters. In our time, it is not the structure of the submarine itself, but the depth of the sea or ocean, that will soon limit the diving depth. Combat by our submarine forces against enemy missile carriers at great depths will alsourely submarine operation with all its inherent characteristics.
The significance of the potential enemy's communication routes from America to Europe, jicrcss t'he Atlantic Ocean and,esser extent, the Pacific Ocean, is well known.
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It is necessary to understand correctly the composition and role of ocean shipments in order toission to the fleet skilfully and to select appropriate forces for the resolution of that mission without expecting more from them than they can accomplish and, at the same time, not assigning them missions which are impossible for them to carry out. Strikesonvoy on the communications routes, carried outroup of submarines or by aircraft, can destroy part of the guard vessels and part of the transports. However, this will have no perceptible influence on the situation on the ground front or on the course of the warhole, foriven instant only tactical success is achievedime when all ocean communications routeshole will have strategic significance. The resultstrikeonvoy must not be judged by individual transport sinkings out of an entire convoy, but by the sinking of the entire convoy, or at least three-fourths of it.
It should be remembered thatumber of instances even the destructiononvoy in its entirety wilL not by any means immediately influence the situation at the front,ampaign, or in the warhole. This is all the more reason why it is necessary toonvoy and not to settle for partial tactical successes in the battle against communications routes.
How, tjien, and by what means, can the destruction of an entire convoy beonvoy whichumber of instances will proceed in separate groups (large units) which do not fall into the zone of one nuclear bomb? In addition, it should be taken into consideration that some of the vessels will proceed without cargoes for purposes of camouflage,
In the immediate future the resolution of an assigned mission only by missile forces from our own territory is not yet very realistic, since an enormous number of missiles will be required even for one convoyransports with its escortigh rate of probability foy its destruction is desired* In resolving this samq mission aviation will require reliable, uninterrupted reconnaissance of the ocean
and, since it is capable ofingle attack, will not be able to reload in the air, but will be forced to return to the airfields, ffe are by no means deprecating the significance of strikes against convoys by aircraft, but we must also note all the weak spots of this type of force.
The matter is different insofar as the capabilities of submarine forces are concerned. Even now, unlike aircraft which can only search for hours, submarine forces can search for convoys independently underwater for tens of days; they can wait until the convoy approaches, overtake it and, without surfacing, take up advantageous positions; then they carry out strikes against the escort forces, break through them for strikes against the transports, and moreover, deliver these strikes repeatedly with the use of underwater nuclear explosions. Naturally, the strike of one submarine squadron will serve as reconnaissance and guidance for another, which can, in several hours, deploy for the completion of the first squadron's strikes against the convoy.
At the present time, and for the immediate future, it is difficult to assume that the enemy convoy escort will quickly and easily detect all the submarine squadronsoeployediven zone of the ocean at various depths and be able to determine where, how many, and what type of submarines are deployed. Atomic submarines will always have superiorityonvoy in speed with all the benefits ensuing from this, including the guarantee of concealment of actions.
The place of departure of convoys and their place of assembly at sea can be established not only by aviation, but by reconnaissance submarines; and in the future the entire mission for the destructiononvoy can be resolved completely within the frameworkubmarine operation. It should be kept in mind that the development of PVO means makes aerial reconnaissance very complex and less reliable than reconnaissance with the aid of submarines.
The parametersubmarine operation for the destructiononvoy are already indicated. In Its battle against communications routes the German-Fascist fleet adopted "wolfpack" methods with the use of reconnaissance submarines. And only the weakness of technical means during tbe period of World Warhe lack of underwater television and means of reliable covert communication, prevented the Fascists from resolving tho problom of submarine operations completely. Allied communications routes were not disrupted. At the present time the means and methods of radiocountermeasures in our country and abroad have improved significantly. The achievements in this field are not to the advantage of guided missiles and aircraft but do not at all affect the ocean depths, where tho means of bydroacoustic concealment and counteraction by submarines areong way from results capable of decisively breakinganeuver and strike by submarine forces.
ubmarine operation during operations against enemy communications routes becomes plausible in all .respects.iven case we also do not exclude the coordinated operation of submarines with aircraft when this is possible, we say,urely "submarine operation" is more effective when it is conducted with decisive goals in mind against comaunications routes whereingle,rolonged and methodical, action is required.
To the extent that the threat to sea communications routes from missile strikesuture war could, unquestionably, see thu appearance of submarine tankers, submarine vessels for transporting troops and cargo, and, finally, specialsubmarine amphibious-force-landing vessels. During the past war there were attempts in our country and abroad to create submarine transports. Thus, we delivered ammunition and supplies by submarines to the besieged naval bases of Hanko and Sevastopol. True, these were not special submarines,but combat vessels with limited capabilities for taking on various cargoes, but the idea of creating submarine transports and underwater communication^ routes received its first practical application
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for the destruction of enemy underwater conununicatic routes and for the protection of our underwater communications routes. Itapparent that missiles and aircraft will not be able to destroy submarine transports in the ocean and sea depths. Of course, it is possible that they could achieve partial tactical successesesult of anatomic explosion capable of destroying one or two submarine transports. However, these successes will not lead to the breakdown of communications routes or to the disruption of deliveries over them.
Underwater communications routes will be at various depths and along different courses, and the submarine transports will proceedispersed manner. Under these conditions, who will be able to find quickly and destroyubmarine convoy? It is apparent that only properly organized submarine squadrons of the submarine forces areosition to resolve this important operational and,umber* of instances, even strategic, mission. Aircraft and, even more so, surface vessels, certainly cannot do it.
It is necessary to mention certain special missions which, though not tied in with strategic tasks, have come up in the past and apparently will face the fleet in the future. We are referring to diversionary^operations of different magnitudes, carried out for the purpose of destroying radar stations^and radio stations of communicationspecial designation, and also to resolve other missions of'thc most varied nature, especially on islands orparsely populated and poorly protected shore. These missions cannot by any means always be resolvedissile, no matter how it may be delivered. Modern technical means permit an installation to be reliably protected evenround nuclear burst. Very frequently it will be necessary not only to knock this or that installation out of commission, but, what^is much more important, to obtain documents andongue". Neither an airborne landingissile can accomplish this mission.
For the resolutionumber of missionsiversionary nature the temporary presence of subunits of aur armed forces at an enemy installation will be required.
Only submarine forces can suddenly and covertly landorce and also quickly and covertly remove It. In past wars there were many examples of such use of submarines, but the scale of these operations was limited.
We haveumber of operations, the aims of which, in our opinion, can most effectively be achieved even today by submarine forces and even more so in the immediate future. We have discussed the destruction of aircraft carriers and missile-carrying submarines, the disruption of surface and underwater communications routes in oceans and seas, and certain diversionary actions of submarine forces.
This is, of course, faromplete list of all of the missions which could be assigned to the navy and, especially, to its submarine forces. To this should be added tbe contribution of missiles fired by submarines against naval bases, shipbuilding yards, and other enemy military installations located on shore and in the zone of interior of the enemy country; also, missions involving coordinated action with troops of our maritime front -by landing forces in the enemy's rear. However, it appears to us that while these missions can be assigned to our submarine forcos today, in the future they can be accomplished with equal success by missile units and long-range aviation. In the resolution of these missions, strategic missiles will completely replace submarine forces, but nothing can replace submarine forces in their battle under the ice and in tho depths of the oceans and seas against enemysubmarines, his submarine transports, and his aircraft carrier strike large units. Therefore, the question arises as to whether it would not be better to orient our submarine forces in tho future chiefly toward those types of operations, the execution of which depends entirely upon them, and inissile (ballistic or from an aircraft) cannot at presentubmarine? Without exception, every type and arm of the armed forces must first of all execute those missions which it has been designated to accomplish and which no one else can accomplish.
It was not just for sport that our naval reconnaissance seaplanesombed troop concentrations on the ground front at Leningrad during the first months of World War II. Of course, during this period no one conducted aerial reconnaissance at sea, since it was impossible 'in those days toaval reconnaissance plane with any otherll aviation operatod on the ground front, kfany seaplanes were lost, but the grave situation at the front at that time necessitated such sacrifices. Such use of naval avlatior cannot serve as an example for the future, for thisnique and atypical case for methods of conducting mililary operations at sea.
The approach of our missile submarines to theto carryissile salvo will alwaysentry into the enemy antisubmarine defensetherefore, if the salvo is carried out fromoutside the PLO zone, from an area of(moreiles from shore),it not better inase to use theof the missile troops or to use For the ocean-going atomic missile submarioevory expensive weapon; it not only carriesbut large groups of highly qualifiedon board. There is no onetrategic missileresults will be the same, and perhaps evenfrom missiles firedubmarine. Why risksubmarine weapon and its entire crew ln suchcause? We might behy then is the
fleet preparing to fire missiles at USSRfrom their submarines? It appears to usis explained by the fact that neither the USAat the present time has strategic missilesrange and, mainly, the accuracy of flight, tobeing fired from USA bases against all
If, nevertheless, our submarine fleet will be assigned the mission of destroying enemy shore and rear area installations, in this case the submarine forces must be organizedew manner. Individual submarine operations off enemy shores must beecause the enemy anti-submarine defense has become very effective. Tae strlh*
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submarine,roup of thorn, must have their own direct underwater protection from enemy submarines; and their own reconnaissance submarines to clear the approach routes and the firing area, which is covered not only by tbe enemy PLO submarines but also by his mine obstacles and other technical means. Thus, oven in this case thereeedpecial large unit of submarines* which we have already mentioned.
In no way by our discussions are we preparing to, doprecate the significance of missile strikes from submarines against enemy naval bases or other of his installations. Wc "are discussing only the selection of the most effective, economical, and reliable weapon for the accomplishmentiven mission. It appears to us that with theand perfection of strategic missiles, missions for the destruction of shore installations by submarines will be eliminated.
The role and significance of first strikes in the initial periodar have been sufficiently delineated in our military literature. The effectiveness of the first strike depends, first of all, upon tho secrecy and tlmoliness of the deployment of tho forceshreatening period. umber of military-political circumstances, it will be necessary to carry outeployment even during peacetime for, so to speak, protective purposes, without the least violation of existing international practices. Which type of weapon can do this with the most secrecy? Who can covertly occupy positions in the area of probable deployment against us by enemy aircraft carriers and missile submarines, or in the area of appearancearge convoy with troops? Obviously, only submarine forces can accomplish this, because as we have already indicated, itery complicated matter to detect their deployment, to say nothing of determining their exact position and the exact number of submarines in tho depths of the ocean and sea.
A few words concerning the supply of submarine forces. Submarine vessels are designatedong stay under water, which their equipment already guarantees. It is
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also necessary to provide for the replenishmentof certain types of supplies for submarines. Not too long ago the possibility ofet aircraft traveling at an enormous speed and height seemedyet today this problem has been resolved. Surface vessels already take on fuel from other vessels while underway, as well as while in anchorage, from storage containers hidden in the depths of the sea. Submarines, however, still come to the surface to take on supplies, and in so doing deprive themselves of all their submarine qualities. It is time to create special supply submarines for supplying submarine squadrons underwater and underwater depots fromubmarine could take on supplies while lying on tho bottom.
It should be kept in mind that tho possibility of counting on stationary surface floating bases ise and more problematical. There is an urgent need for underwater submarine supply bases in bays near our shores or for special submarines to furnish supplies away from bases. The technical solution of this problem is entirely possible.
What kind of deductions can be made from all that has been discussed?
First of all, it appears to us that the appearance of independent submarine operations in naval art is completely natural. Tho object and goal of those operations will be such that no other types or arms of the armed forces except submarine forces will be able to engage ln or achieve then. We have in mind combat with enemy missile-carrying submarines in the Arctic, under the ice, or in tho depths of non-freezing oceans and seas, and also, the destruction of underwater and surface communications routes. In the future, submarine operations will be able to achieve operational, as well as strategic, goals.
Submarine operations will also be conducted in those instances when the accomplishmentission Jointly with aviation, or by aviation alone, is diffrcult or, for many reasons, temporarily Impossible.' We arc referring to the
conduct of submarine operations involving the destruction of the carrier strike large unit (AUS) and the destruction of naval bases and the forces stationed there, as wellumber of diversionary operations, including the landing of tactical amphibious forces.
During the conduct of submarine operations with any type of goals/umber of instances, when it isoint operation of submarines with various types and arms of the armed forces is not excluded, first of all with the missile troops and aviation; but at the same time it should be remembered that forms of coordinated operations,besides strategic ones, are becoming more and more complex.
In order to support the conduct of submarine operations, it appears to us that it is necessary now toumber of organizational and technical problems:
-first of all, to work out the organization oflarge units
-toystem of covert underwater communications and television in order to ensure navigational security of movement in the depths and to maintain position in an underwater formation, as well as to control the large unit during the delivery of strikes against the enemy underwater;
-to create navigational charts especially for the operation of submarine forces at all depths attainable by them (with an indication on the charts of the temperature, density, and transparency cf the water, and the relief of the bottom, currents, and other data);
-to work out and create materiel-technical means for underwater navigation (underwater beacons with coded format) in our own as well as in neutral waters; and also, means of obstruction, placed covertly from submarines (light nets in combination with mines);
-to workystem for all*types of underwater supply, for submarines lying on the bottom at points of dispersal
and at definite depths and not
-tolass of special submarine tankers and submarine transports for the shipment of combat supplies equipment, and contingents of personnel.
None of these proposals is fantastic,umber of them already are coming into being. The task now consists of creating an orderly system of theoretical postulates and to give clear-cut "orders" to our technology on the basis of these, lest the realities of combat operations of submarines catch us unawares.
In this article we have attempted to present and. wherever possible, to substantiate, certain problematical questions of submarine operations which are subject to detailed elaboration, because submarine forces must, above all, prepare themselves for the conduct of submarine operations as the naval operations of the future.
Original document.
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